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As the public anxiously awaited the publication of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s highly anticipated same-sex marriage decision in
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Obergefell v. Hodges,1 the country braced itself for the next wave of
an ongoing “kultur kampf”—the cultural war—in the name of religion
and against LGBT rights.2  On June 26, 2015, the Court issued an his-
toric decision, which extended the constitutionally protected funda-
mental right to marry to same-sex couples.3  Although LGBT
advocates and legal scholars cheered the Court’s landmark holding,
the social, religious, and moral debate is far from over.4  In fact, the
Court’s decision brought a new brand of anti-same-sex marriage activ-
ism.  Kentucky clerk, Kim Davis (Davis), became the face of this
movement.5
Davis made headline news when she refused to issue marriage li-
censes to same-sex couples.6  Rather than follow the Court’s order to
issue marriage licenses to all couples, she opted to spend five days in
jail for contempt of court.7  At a press conference following her re-
lease from jail, Davis was hailed as a hero.8  Flanked by her attorney
and Republican presidential candidates, former Arkansas Governor
Mike Huckabee and Texas Senator Ted Cruz, Davis thanked the
crowd for supporting her and promised to continue the fight for relig-
ious freedom.9
Davis is not the only government official defying the Obergefell de-
cision through civil disobedience.  Others echo her battle cry for relig-
ious freedom.  Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton declared that “no
court, no law, no rule, and no words will change the simple truth that
marriage is the union of one man and one woman.”10  He encouraged
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. See, e.g., Laura Meckler & Ana Campoy, Arkansas Governor Calls for Changes to ‘Relig-
ious Freedom’ Bill, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/arkansas-governor-calls-for-
changes-to-religious-freedom-bill-1427904740 (last updated Apr. 1, 2015, 7:43 PM).
3. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607–08.
4. See Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, States Renew Fight To Stop Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/us/battles-over-same-sex-marriage-roil-
statehouses-ahead-of-supreme-courts-decision.html?_r=1 (“This fight will continue on regardless
of which way the Supreme Court rules.” (quoting Brian S. Brow, President, National Organiza-
tion for Marriage)).
5. See Alan Blinder & Richard Pe´rez-Pena, Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex Marriage Li-
censes, Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/same-
sex-marriage-kentucky-kim-davis.html?_r=0.
6. Id.
7. See Alan Blinder & Richard Pe´rez-Pena, Kim Davis, Released from Kentucky Jail, Won’t
Say if She Will Keep Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/
09/us/kim-davis-same-sex-marriage.html.
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Eliott C. McLaughlin, Most States To Abide by Supreme Court’s Same-Sex Marriage Rul-
ing, But . . ., CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/29/us/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/ (last up-
dated June 30, 2015, 1:20 PM).
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government officials to refuse to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples and, although officials may be sued, the Attorney General
promised that his office would assist those religious objectors.11  The
Alabama Supreme Court, led by the now-infamous Chief Judge
Moore, refused to recognize a same-sex adoption that was legally per-
formed in Georgia.12  And Louisiana Republican Governor Bobby
Jindal, who was a candidate for the 2016 presidential ticket, stated
that the biblical definition of marriage comes from God and that “no
earthly court can alter that.”13  He expressed concern that the Court’s
decision was the beginning of an “assault against the religious free-
dom rights of Christians who disagree with this decision.”14
As government officials and politicos expressed disdain for the
Court’s decision and vowed to disobey it, many commentators in-
voked memories of former governors blocking efforts to desegregate
public schools after Brown v. Board of Education.15  Nine years after
Brown, former Alabama Governor George Wallace refused to admit
two African-American students to the University of Alabama.16  In
his refusal, he followed through with a promise he had made during
his inaugural address when, standing on the capitol steps, he declared
to a supportive crowd that he believed in “segregation now, segrega-
tion tomorrow, segregation forever.”17  Also in defiance of the Court’s
11. Id.
12. Debra Cassens Weiss, Alabama Supreme Court Refuses to Recognize Lesbian Adoption
Granted in Georgia, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 21, 2015, 7:20 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/arti
cle/alabama_supreme_court_refuses_to_recognize_lesbian_adoption_granted_in_geor/.
13. Carrie Dann & Andrew Rafferty, 2016 Candidates React To Supreme Court’s Gay Mar-
riage Ruling, NBC NEWS (June 26, 2015, 1:58 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-elec
tion/2016-candidates-react-supreme-courts-gay-marriage-ruling-n382441 (quoting Bobby Jindal,
Louisiana Governor).
14. Id. (quoting Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Governor).
15. See, e.g., Jessica Chasmar, Joe Biden: Gay Marriage Ruling ‘as Consequential As Brown v.
the Board,’ WASH. TIMES (July 10, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/10/joe-
biden-gay-marriage-ruling-as-consequential-as-/; Jericka Duncan, Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis Re-
mains Defiant on Same-Sex Marriage, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/kentucky-clerk-
kim-davis-remains-defiant-on-same-sex-marriage/ (last updated Sept. 25, 2015, 7:17 PM); David
A. Graham, Can States Ignore the Supreme Court on Gay Marriage?, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/nullification-again/397373/; Ilya Somin, A
Great Decision on Same-Sex Marriage – But Based on Dubious Reasoning, WASH. POST, June 26,
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/26/a-great-decision-
on-same-sex-marriage-but-based-on-dubious-reasoning/. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. TONY A. FREYER, LITTLE ROCK ON TRIAL: COOPER V. AARON AND SCHOOL DESEGRE-
GATION 222 (2007); Anthony Stanford, Case of Kim Davis Brings Back Memories of George
Wallace, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/aurora-beacon-news/
opinion/ct-abn-stanford-column-st-0913-20150911-story.html.
17. Stanford, supra note 16 (quoting George C. Wallace, Governor of Alabama, Inaugural R
Address (Jan. 14, 1963)).  The segregationist governor allegedly changed his mind, admitting he
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decision in Brown, former Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus enlisted
the state national guard to barricade nine African-American students’
entrance into Central High School in Little Rock.18
Long before the Court announced its decision in Obergefell, oppo-
nents of same-sex marriage galvanized political support and success-
fully lobbied legislators to minimize or block the aftershock of an
anticipated decision favoring same-sex marriage rights.  These legisla-
tive responses took various forms.  At the state level, state Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) took center stage.19  Although
many states had existing RFRA statutes, other states adopted laws far
more protective of religious freedom than the federal RFRA.20  Other
legislative efforts included state laws blocking local efforts to pass
nondiscrimination ordinances that extended antidiscrimination pro-
tections to the LGBT community.21
At the federal level, Republican legislators revived a version of the
First Amendment Defense Act, which was first proposed in 2013.22  In
its essence, the Act excuses discrimination against same-sex married
couples or would-be couples based on religious or moral objections.23
The Act protects those who discriminate based on religious or moral
reasons from retaliatory actions affecting federal tax benefits, grants,
contracts, or licenses.24
Despite the rhetoric of public officials like Davis, Texas Attorney
General Ken Paxton, and Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal, state and
federal government actors are expected to perform public duties
within the bounds of the laws of the land and the federal Constitu-
was wrong, when he later ran for political office. See Leonard Pitts Jr., Did Wallace Truly
Change His Racist Views?, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1998, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-09-
22/news/9809220030_1_george-wallace-bland-segregation-tomorrow.  This remarkable shift in at-
titude will likely occur again in twenty or more years as opponents of LGBT rights reflect on
their former positions and realize that they were on the wrong side of history.
18. Sondra Gordy, Lost Year, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARK, HIST. & CULTURE, http://www.encyclope-
diaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=737 (last updated Aug. 9, 2013).
19. See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 15,
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx.
20. See, e.g., S.B. 975, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (codified as amended at
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-401 to 123-407 (2016)); S.B. 50, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2015) (codified as amended at IND. CODE §§ 34-13-9-0.7 to 34-13-9-11 (West 2015)); S.B.
2681, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014) (codified as amended at MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11-61-1 (2014)).
21. See, e.g., S.B. 202, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (codified as amended at
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-1-401 to 1-403); S.B. 101, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015)
(codified as amended at IND. CODE §§ 34-13-9-1 to 10); H.B. 2881, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (W. Va. 2015).
22. First Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. (2015).
23. Id. § 3.
24. Id.
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tion.25  Government actors are not free to discriminate in carrying out
their public duties under the guise of free exercise or free speech.26
Dating back to the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments,
discrimination by state actors could be remedied in federal courts;27
however, private discrimination remained a private issue.28  It took
another eighty years for the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold a federal
public accommodation law as a valid exercise of Congress’s Com-
merce Clause powers.29  Prior to 1964, private discrimination in public
accommodations went unregulated and unreviewable unless a state
law prohibited this type of action.30  With few exceptions, from the
time of the first public accommodation laws to the present,31 protec-
tion from discrimination did not extend to members of the LGBT
community.
The backlash to the Obergefell decision is real and palpable.  Hav-
ing lost in the courts, the opponents of same-sex marriage have al-
tered their battle cry.  Invoking religious freedom, instead of
defending their right to discriminate, they now claim to be the victims
of discrimination.  This Article focuses on the tension and interplay
between those advocating for LGBT-inclusive laws and those seeking
25. Elizabeth B. Wydra, U.S. Constitution: Public Officials Wanted, Willingness To Follow the
Law a Must, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-b-wydra/us-constitu
tion-public-of_b_8090068.html (last updated Sept. 2, 2015, 5:49 PM).
26. Elected officials set policy, are held accountable to the electorate, and are removable by
statutory or constitutional dictates.  For example, Kim Davis could be removed by a special act
of the legislature.  Chris Geidner, Few Options To Remove Kentucky Clerk from Office,
BUZZFEED, http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/it-would-be-very-difficult-to-remove-kentuc
ky-clerk-from-off (last updated Sept. 2, 2015, 5:49 PM).  But, government employees’ free
speech rights are limited when speaking on public matters within the scope of their official du-
ties. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
27. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (granting Congress the power to enact legisla-
tion enforcing the abolishment of slavery); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress the power to
enact legislation enforcing the states prohibition of abridging citizens privileges or immunities);
id. amend. XV, § 2 (granting Congress the power to enact legislation enforcing the right to vote).
28. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating federal public accommodation
law and stating that private discrimination implicates social rights, not legal rights, and cannot be
enforced through the Fourteenth Amendment).
29. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations,
as a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers).
30. See Julian Maxwell Hayter, To End Divisions: Reflections on the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 499, 509–10 (2015).
31. There are exceptions in that roughly 255 local nondiscrimination ordinances and a few
state laws do provide protections to LGBT members. Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimina-
tion Ordinances That Include Gender Identity, HUM. RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/re
sources/cities-and-counties-with-non-discrimination-ordinances-that-include-gender (last up-
dated Jan. 28, 2016); see, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12920, 12940, 12926 (West 2011); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402 (West 2015); 1991 Conn. Acts 91-58 (Reg. Session); 775 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/1-102 (2014); IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2015).
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protection under state, mini RFRAs from what they characterize as
religious discrimination to resist the trend toward LGBT equal rights.
Both religious freedom and equal protection are prized constitu-
tional rights.  They can coexist even in this deeply charged war be-
tween religious freedom and LGBT rights.  Some religions and
religious observers believe that marriage between two individuals of
the same sex is a sin, and, undoubtedly, the First Amendment protects
their right to this belief.  However, at some point, a religious belief
cannot be foisted on others in the secular sphere of life.  Defining this
point has and continues to be a delicate, and often imperfect, task of
line drawing.  Although the proverbial line in the sand is too formulaic
and rigid to apply to all cases, this Article borrows an analysis from
another First Amendment right—freedom of speech.
In the context of free speech, a person offended by someone else’s
speech does not possess a “heckler’s veto” to silence the speaker.32
By analogy, the offense of someone else’s conduct or status should not
give license to deny equal rights in public accommodations under the
guise of religious freedom.  Those seeking a RFRA defense to violat-
ing public accommodation laws are labeling personal offense as relig-
ious freedom to justify imposing a heckler’s veto on serving members
of the LGBT community in public accommodations.
Part II of this Article sets the stage for a discussion of the tension
between religious freedom and increasing rights for the LGBT com-
munity, explaining through a historical lens how the conflict devel-
oped and summarizing states’ attempts to mitigate the perceived
threat of same-sex marriage in advance of the landmark Obergefell
decision.33  Part III considers the impact of the Court’s decision in
Obergefell, emphasizing the narrowness of the decision and the unan-
swered questions that still lie in Obergefell’s wake.34  Part IV illus-
trates the way in which the tension between religion and LGBT rights
have and will continue to play out inside the courtroom.35  Part V sug-
gests a novel framework for determining when an objector’s religious
exercise is sufficiently burdened to trump an LGBT individual’s right
to equal protection.36
32. See Foresyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992); Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949); see also Cheryl A. Leanza,
Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305,
1305–06 (2007) (explaining that heckler veto cases grant a First Amendment protection to the
speaker).
33. See infra notes 39–102 and accompanying text. R
34. See infra notes 103–33 and accompanying text. R
35. See infra notes 134–56 and accompanying text. R
36. See infra notes 157–255 and accompanying text. R
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Part VI then suggests a framework for resolving the tension be-
tween religious exercise and LGBT rights.37  In conclusion, this Arti-
cle posits that the courts must undertake a delicate balancing act in
managing the tension between public accommodation laws and
RFRA-based religious freedom claims.38  In doing so, the courts
should distinguish between offense and religious belief.  When denial
of services is based on offense (even if grounded in religious doctrine),
enforcing public accommodation laws is not at odds with religious
freedom.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the reason why states have begun rapidly adopting
mini RFRAs, one must consider the historical context from which re-
ligious exercise challenges to same-sex marriage rights were first in-
voked.  Religious exercise challenges increased as states and
municipalities began recognizing rights for nontraditional sexual
choices and identities.  Like a pendulum, the country has seen a swing
in both directions of the civil rights continuum—with states almost
universally banning same-sex marriage in the 1970s and 1980s to the
post-United States v. Windsor39 movement during which municipalities
enlarged protections for LGBT individuals through the passage of lo-
cal anti-discrimination ordinances.
From this historical perspective, the following discussion will ex-
plain: (1) the environmental factors that contributed to the birth of
the LGBT civil rights movement; (2) the legislative resistance to that
movement that took the form of the mini RFRA; and (3) other legis-
lative efforts that pit religion against LGBT civil rights.
A. The Rise of the LGBT Civil Rights Movement
The LGBT Civil Rights Movement was in its embryonic stage in
1970, when two University of Minnesota gay rights activists applied
for a marriage certificate in Minneapolis.40  After being denied the
certificate on the basis of a Minnesota state law, which defined mar-
riage as between one man and one woman, the gay couple invoked the
help of the Minnesota courts, arguing that the Minnesota law of-
fended the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.41  In 1971,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the law defining marriage as
37. See infra notes 256–73 and accompanying text. R
38. See infra notes 274–80 and accompanying text. R
39. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
40. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971).
41. Id. at 185–86.
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between one man and one woman was constitutional, relying on the
state’s insistence that procreation was a central purpose of a state-
sanctioned marriage.42   The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the case
“for want of a substantial federal question.”43  Despite the fact that
scholars and practitioners debate the extent of its precedential effect,
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Nelson44 has been cited
as grounds for denying same-sex couples the right to marry.45
Following the Baker decision in 1971, states began codifying the
traditional definition of marriage through the enactment of constitu-
tional bans on same-sex marriage, which resulted in a litany of law-
suits against the various states.46  In 1973, Maryland became the first
state to enact a statutory ban on same-sex marriage, and Hawaii sub-
sequently granted power to its state legislature to ban same-sex mar-
riages.47  By the late 1990s, thirty-eight states implemented measures
limiting the state-recognized institution of marriage to unions between
one man and one woman.48
In 1996, former-President Bill Clinton further bolstered the move-
ment by signing the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),49 which per-
petuated the definition of marriage codified in federal law as “only a
legal union between one man and one woman.”50  Soon thereafter,
42. Id. at 186–87.
43. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015).
44. 409 U.S. 810.
45. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 4, 38, 44, 47, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556),
2015 WL 1384100.
46. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that a union
between the two female plaintiffs was not a marriage, and therefore it was unnecessary for the
court to even consider the constitutional violation arguments the plaintiffs raised), abrogated by
Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 2584; Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. App. 1974) (finding that
the state’s statutory restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples did not violate plaintiffs’
constitutional rights); see also Mark Niesse, Hawaii Is the Latest Civil Unions Battleground, AS-
SOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 22, 2009), http://www.webcitation.org/5ewPtDMg0 (stating that pursuant
to the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), the Hawaii
state legislature promptly passed a constitutional amendment allowing the legislature to restrict
marriage to couples of the opposite sex).
47. History and Timeline of the Freedom to Marry in the United States, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/history-and-timeline-of-marriage (last updated June 26,
2015).
48. See Michael E. Solimine, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, the Public Policy
Exception, and Clear Statements of Extraterritorial Effect, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 105, 110 (2010).
See generally JEFFREY E. COHEN, PUBLIC OPINION IN STATE POLITICS 168–69 (2006); Donald P.
Haider-Markel, Policy Diffusion as a Geographical Expansion of the Scope of Political Conflict:
Same-Sex Marriage Bans in the 1990s, 1 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 5, 9–10 (2001).
49. Pub L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
50. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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stories of same-sex couples deprived of federal benefits began surfac-
ing in the headlines.51
During and after this time, religious groups on both sides of the
issue publicly announced their positions.  In 2000, the Central Confer-
ence of American Rabbis, a large clergy organization attached to the
Jewish Reform Movement, agreed to sanction religious ceremonies
for same-sex couples.52  Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s
landmark 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas,53 declaring laws
criminalizing same-sex sodomy unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Vatican widely renounced same-sex marriage, cau-
tioning Catholic politicians that same-sex marriage was “gravely im-
moral.”54  In the court of public opinion, polls conducted in 2003
revealed that the majority of U.S. citizens opposed same-sex
marriage.55
During the early to mid 2000s, the tides began to change as homo-
sexual politicians and other lesbian and gay public figures became
commonplace in the U.S. media.  Meanwhile, in other more progres-
sive parts of the world, countries like the Netherlands56 and Belgium57
51. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Denied Survivor’s Benefits After Wife’s Death, Texas Widow Files
a Federal Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2014,  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/denied-survi
vors-benefits-after-wifes-death-texas-widow-files-a-federal-suit.html?_r=0.  For a general over-
view on the extent of social security benefits that same-sex couples were generally denied, see
BEN FURNAS & JOSH ROSENTHAL, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, BENEFITS DENIED 1 (2009), https://
cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/03/pdf/benefits_denied.pdf and ROBIN
MARIL & CAROLL ESTES, LIVING OUTSIDE THE SAFETY NET: LGBT FAMILIES & SOCIAL SE-
CURITY 7–13 (2013), http://www.asaging.org/sites/default/files/files/LGBT-Families-and-Social-
Security.pdf.
52. Resolution on Same Gender Officiation, CTR. CONF. AM. RABBIS (2000), https://
www.ccarnet.org/rabbis-speak/resolutions/2000/same-gender-officiation/.
53. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
54. Vatican Fights Gay Marriages, CNN (July 31, 2003, 10:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2003/
WORLD/europe/07/31/vatican.gay.marriages/.
55. See, e.g., Will Lester, Majority Favors Law Against Gay Marriage, J. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2003,
3:24 PM), http://journaltimes.com/news/national/poll-majority-of-americans-favors-laws-against-
gay-marriage/article_3d7af07c-983e-5d3d-b780-38916aa79fc3.html; Adam Nagourney & Janet
Elder, The 2004 Campaign: The Poll; Nation’s Direction Prompts Voters’ Concern, Poll Finds,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/16/us/the-2004-campaign-the-poll-
nation-s-direction-prompts-voters-concern-poll-finds.html (“By 59 percent to 35 percent, respon-
dents said they supported a constitutional amendment that would ‘allow marriage only between
a man and a woman.’  But 56 percent said that they did not view the issue as important enough
to merit changing the nation’s constitution.” (quoting New York Times/CBS News poll)).
56. See Same-Sex Marriage Legalized in Amsterdam, CNN (Apr. 1, 2001, 8:40 AM), http://
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0104/01/sm.10.html.
57. See International Progress Toward the Freedom To Marry, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://
archive-freedomtomarry.org/get_informed/marriage_basics/history/international_progress.php
(last updated June 26, 2015).
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legalized same-sex marriage, and even the King of Cambodia publicly
announced his support for same-sex marriage.58
In February 2011, the Obama Administration instructed the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) to stop defending DOMA in court and
called for heightened scrutiny in federal lawsuits challenging same-sex
marriage bans.59  In response to the Obama Administration’s decision,
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) convened to defend
DOMA in place of the DOJ.60
On June 26, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Windsor v.
United States61 and held that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional
insofar as it limited marriage to one man and one woman.62  The deci-
sion was the first extension of federal benefits to married same-sex
couples, and it opened the door to challenge marriage inequality in
the courts.63
Following Windsor, a wave of legal battles challenging same-sex
marriage bans percolated its way through the nation’s state and fed-
eral courts.64 Between 2013 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s considera-
tion of the issue in Obergefell in 2015, the nation’s courts heard over
fifty challenges to same-sex marriage bans.65  Of these cases, the over-
whelming majority of courts upheld marriage equality, finding that
58. See Cambodian King Backs Gay Marriage, BBC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2004, 11:59 AM), http://
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3505915.stm.  The king said that as a “‘liberal democracy’,
Cambodia should allow ‘marriage between man and man . . . or between woman and woman.’
He said he had respect for homosexual and lesbians and said they were as they were because
God loved a ‘wide range of tastes.’” Id. (alteration in orginial) (quoting Norodom Sihanouk,
King of Cambodia).
59. Jerry Markon & Sandhya Somashekhar, In Gay Rights Victory, Obama Administration
Won’t Defend Defense of Marriage Act, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2011, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/23/AR2011022303428.html; see United States v. Wind-
sor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683–84 (2013).
60. Chris Johnson, House Approves Rules Affirming Commitment to DOMA, WASH. BLADE
(Jan. 4, 2013, 3:27 AM), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2013/01/04/house-approves-rules-af
firming-commitment-to-doma/.
61. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
62. Id. at 2696.
63. Id. at 2695–96.
64. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352
(4th Cir. 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014), reversed by Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014),
amended by Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352; De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014);
Jernigan v. Crane, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (E.D. Ark. 2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410
(M.D. Pa. 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
65. Gay Marriage Timeline: History of the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, PROCON.ORG, http://
gaymarriage.procon.org/view.timeline.php?timelineID=000030 (last updated Oct. 6, 2014, 12:27
AM).
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same-sex marriage bans violated equal protection and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees.66
Echoing the lyrical language of Windsor, Justice Kennedy again
spoke of human dignity in striking down the same-sex marriage
bans.67  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held that the funda-
mental right to marriage extends to all couples, and anything less than
full state recognition of these loving and committed relationships of-
fends the dignity of same-sex couples and their families.68  The Court’s
decision was a huge victory for the LBGT community; however, be-
cause it invoked substantive due process instead of equal protection,
Obergefell did little to affect the discrimination that members of the
LGBT community faced in other aspects of civil life.69  “In most
states, a same-sex couple can get married on Saturday, post pictures
on Facebook on Sunday, and then risk being fired from their job or
kicked out of their apartment on Monday . . . .”70
Due to the limited reach of Obergefell and the near absence of fed-
eral antidiscrimination protections for LGBT individuals in the areas
of employment, housing, and public accommodations,71 the LGBT
66. See, e.g., Baskin, 766 F.3d at 671–72; Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 367; Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at
544; Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 483–84; De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 639–40; Jernigan, 64 F. Supp.
3d at 1288; Whitewood, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 423–24; Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1028. But see, e.g.,
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388, 418 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (holding
that prohibiting same-sex marriage is not a violation of the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment
rights); Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 927–28 (E.D. La. 2014) (holding that Louisi-
ana’s definition of marriage, as being between a man and a woman, does not infringe on the U.S.
Constitution), rev’d, Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 791 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2015); Sevcik v. Sandoval,
911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 997 (D. Nev. 2012) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment do not prohibit Nevada’s definition of marriage as being between a man
and a woman), rev’d, Latta v. Otter, 779 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2014).
67. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2696 (2013) (“[DOMA] is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to
disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in per-
sonhood and dignity.”).
68. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
69. William N. Eskridge Jr., The Marriage Equality Cases and Constitutional Theory, 2015
CATO S. CT. REV. 111, 112.
70. Dominic Holden, Democrats Plan To Introduce Sweeping LBGT Rights Bill in Congress
This Week, BUZZFEED NEWS, http://www.buzzfeed.com/dominicholden/democrats-plan-to-intro-
duce-sweeping-lgbt-rights-bill-in-con#.weqNkGVOM (last updated July 21, 2015, 5:18 PM)
(quoting Letter from David Cicilline, Rhode Island Representative, to Members of Congress
(July 20, 2015)) (proposing a comprehensive, broad-sweeping legislative proposal that would
prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation in eight
categories).
71. See Danielle Weatherby, Why America’s Small Businesses Aren’t Cheering Same-Sex Mar-
riage, FORTUNE (July 15, 2015, 10:26 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/15/why-americas-small-
businesses-arent-cheering-same-sex-marriage/; Danielle Weatherby et al., The Supreme Court
Upholds Same-Sex Marriage: Expert Reaction, CONVERSATION (June 26, 2015, 7:36 PM), https://
theconversation.com/the-supreme-court-upholds-same-sex-marriage-expert-reaction-43961.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-3\DPL305.txt unknown Seq: 12 28-SEP-16 9:27
918 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:907
community must find protection in state and local laws.  Currently,
only nineteen states prohibit employment discrimination and discrimi-
nation in places of public accommodations on the basis of sexual ori-
entation and gender identity.72  Three states—New York, New
Hampshire, and Wisconsin—have state-wide protections for employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.73
At a local level, 255 municipalities, including Boise, Houston,
Omaha, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, San Antonio, and Tucson, prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.74
Many other municipalities have met public resistance in attempting to
carve out protections for LGBT individuals in their city codes.75
Despite vigorous opposition, same-sex marriage protection contin-
ued to spread across the country, and LGBT anti-discrimination laws
rapidly increased, causing many states to fear an Obergefell-like deci-
sion that would guarantee broad civil rights for the LGBT population.
Consequently, state RFRA laws became the legal missile targeted at
marriage equality.  What followed in conservative states was the
proliferation of increasingly robust mini RFRA laws.76  As the judici-
ary continued to invalidate bans on same-sex marriage, and as munici-
palities adopted LGBT-protective antidiscrimination laws, states
continued to push back with the adoption of robust religious freedom
laws.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,77 a federal law,
was the first RFRA and was signed into law by former-President Bill
Clinton.  It unanimously passed the House of Representatives, in
which it was sponsored by then-Congressman Chuck Schumer, and it
sailed through the Senate on a 97-3 vote.78
72. See Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Map, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/non-
discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last visited June 5, 2016).
73. Id.
74. Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances That Include Gender Identity,
supra note 31. R
75. See, e.g., Kendra Evensen, LGBT Ordinance on Ballot: Pocatello Voters to Decide on
Nondiscrimination Measure in May, IDAHO ST. J.  (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.idahostatejournal.
com/members/public-vote-set-on-pocatello-s-new-lgbt-anti-discrimination/article_8c279f52-3b71-
11e3-8f52-001a4bcf887a.html; John Wright, Legislative Proposal Would Nullify LGBT Nondis-
crimination Laws, TEX. OBSERVER (Jan. 13, 2015, 1:42 PM), http://www.texasobserver.org/legisla
tive-proposal-nullify-lgbt-nondiscrimination-laws/.
76. See, e.g., S.B. 202, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); H.B. 1632, 119th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015).
77. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4
(2012)).
78. See Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 2 PUB. PAPERS
2000 (Nov. 16, 1993).
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In response to an unfavorable U.S. Supreme Court decision, Con-
gress passed RFRA to reinstate the standard of judicial review for
courts to apply in religious liberty cases.79  Even when a law does not
target religion and is generally applicable, RFRA prohibits a person’s
free exercise of religion to be “substantially burdened” by the law un-
less it furthers a “compelling governmental interest” in the “least re-
strictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”80  RFRA certainly does not provide that a person making a
religious claim will always prevail.  Indeed, in the years since RFRA
was passed, courts have sometimes ruled in favor of religious exemp-
tions and, other times, have placed other priorities above religious
exercise.
B. The Proliferation of the Mini RFRA
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Boerne v. Flores,81
which held that the federal RFRA was generally inapplicable against
state and local laws.82  Since then, twenty states have enacted their
own RFRA statutes, and court decisions in other states  provide
RFRA-like protections.83
Many of the mini RFRA mimic the federal RFRAs by reinstating
strict scrutiny review for challenges to government regulations that
are alleged to substantially burden religious exercise.84  But other
state RFRAs have key provisions that extend far beyond their federal
parent.  For example, some significantly dilute the substantial burden
requirement (requiring only that the challenged law “burdens” or “re-
stricts” religious exercise).85  Some envision the practice of religion to
extend to any act or inaction that is tangentially related to a person’s
religious beliefs.86  And some even add a “clear and convincing” evi-
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
80. RFRA provides that the “[g]overnment may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in further-
ance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.”  Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
81. 521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as recognized in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
82. Id. at 534–36.
83. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (Arkansas and Indiana). R
84. See, e.g., H.B. 1632, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015) See generally 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(b).
85. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 622, § II, cl. 3; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (2006); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (2008); H.B. 15-1171, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015) (post-
poned indefinitely).
86. See, e.g., 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West 2014).
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dence requirement to satisfy strict scrutiny, making the government’s
burden of justifying the challenged law even more onerous.87
Against this backdrop, on the last day of March 2015, the Arkansas
legislature passed House Bill 1228,88 an expansive religious freedom
law that had been the topic of a heated public debate.89  With several
civil rights organizations, mega-corporations like Walmart and Target,
and even his own son’s signed petition urging him to veto 1228, Gov-
ernor Asa Hutchinson sent it back to the legislature to amend the bill
to mirror its federal counterpart.90  Arkansas narrowly dodged a bul-
let when Governor Hutchinson signed a new bill that essentially mir-
rored its federal parent.91
Arkansas is one of the twenty-one states that passed a mini
RFRA.92  In fact, Arkansas’s attempt to pass an expansive religious
freedom law followed the mini RFRA saga in Indiana, where, after
public outcry, Governor Mike Pence demanded amendments to the
law to appease the concern that the law would open the door to sex
and gender discrimination.93  The changes clarified that the law would
not supersede local ordinances that banned discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity.94
87. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5303 (Supp. 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (Supp.
2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 251 to 258 (West 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (Supp.
2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02 (2012); S.B. 101, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015);
see also 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2404 (requiring proof by a preponderance of the
evidence).
88. H.B. 1228, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015).
89. Mark Berman, Arkansas Lawmakers Approve Religious Liberty Bill Despite Firestorm
over Indiana Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation
/wp/2015/03/31/after-a-firestorm-over-indianas-religious-law-is-arkansas-next/.
90. Ana Campoy, Arkansas Gov. Signs Narrower Religious-Liberty Bill After Outcry, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 2, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/arkansas-lawmakers-pass-narrower-religious-lib
erty-bill-after-outcry-1428006065.
91. Id.
92. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, supra note 19. R
93. Scott Bomboy, Explaining the Indiana RFRA Controversy in Five Minutes, NAT’L CONST.
CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/04/explaining-the-indiana-rfra-con
troversy-in-five-minutes/; see Eric Bradner & Jeremy Diamond, Mike Pence: ‘Was I Expecting
This Kind of Backlash? Heavens No,’ CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/31/politics/pence-will-
fix-religious-freedom-legislation/ (last updated Mar. 31, 2015, 7:36 PM); Tony Cook et al., Gov.
Mike Pence Signs RFRA Fix, INDYSTAR (Apr. 2, 2015, 8:08 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/
news/politics/2015/04/01/indiana-rfra-deal-sets-limited-protections-for-lgbt/70766920/; Ed Payne,
Indiana Religious Freedom Restoration Act: What You Need To Know, CNN, http://www.cnn.
com/2015/03/31/politics/indiana-backlash-how-we-got-here/ (last updated Mar. 31, 2015, 12:53
PM); Rick Ungar, Understanding Why Indiana’s RFRA Clears the Way to Discriminating Against
LGBT Americans, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2015, 12:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/
2015/03/30/understanding-why-indianas-rfra-clears-the-way-to-discriminating-against-lgbt-ameri
cans/.
94. Tony Cook et al., Indiana Governor Signs Amended ‘Religious Freedom’ Law, USA TO-
DAY (Apr. 2, 2015, 6:50 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/02/indiana-re
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Although Arkansas and Indiana pulled back their religious freedom
laws due to public furor, the proliferation of similar laws in other
states will add to a patchwork set of robust religious freedom laws.95
Collectively, these laws threaten to produce a new wave of separate
but equal—this time affecting a powerfully underrepresented class,
the LGBT community.
C. Other Measures That Pit Religion Against LGBT Rights
As another response to the recognition of LGBT individuals’ legal
rights, states fearing the labeling of sexual orientation as a quasi-sus-
pect class have added to their arsenal against growing LGBT civil
rights laws intended to halt the proliferation of local anti-discrimina-
tion ordinances.  For example, Arkansas recently passed the Intrastate
Commerce Improvement Act, which prohibits a municipality or politi-
cal subdivision of the state from adopting or enforcing an “ordinance,
resolution, rule, or policy that creates a protected classification or pro-
hibits discrimination on a basis not contained in state law.”96  Because
Arkansas State antidiscrimination laws do not currently protect mem-
bers of the LGBT community, this law effectively preempts the rights
of local government to create these protections.  The constitutionality
of laws like the Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act is undoubt-
edly questionable, especially in light of Romer v. Evans,97 but state
lawmakers are willing to chance a constitutional challenge in defense
of their law.98
In anticipation of an unfavorable Obergefell ruling, Republican leg-
islatures in nearby Oklahoma and Texas introduced bills that would
ligious-freedom-law-deal-gay-discrimination/70819106/; CNN Staff, Read Indiana’s Religious
Freedom Law Legislative Fix, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/02/politics/indiana-religious-
freedom-legislative-fix/ (last updated Apr. 2, 2015, 10:02 AM).
95. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 622; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1493 to -1493.02 (Supp.
2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01–.05 (West 2016); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 73-401 to -404 (2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1 to /99 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 60-5301 to -5305 (Supp. 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5231–:5242 (2012); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-61-1 (Supp. 2014); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.302, 1.307 (2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-
1 to 22-5 (LexisNexis 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51 §§ 251–58 (West Supp. 2016); 71 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401–07 (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-80.1-1 to .1-4 (2006); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to 1-32-60 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 (Supp. 2014) (amended by
S.B. 1221, 109th Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015)); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 110.001 to
.012 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-1 to -2.1 (2012); S.B. 129, Gen. Assemb., 2015-2016 Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 2015) (passed in the Senate); S.B. 101, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015)
(amended by S.B. 50, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015)); S.B. 4, 2015–2016 Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 2015) (introduced to Senate); H.B. 83, 2015 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2015).
96. S.B. 202, § 14-1-403, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015).
97. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
98. See Fausset & Blinder, supra note 4. R
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prohibit state and local government employees from issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples despite federal law declaring same-sex
marriage bans unconstitutional.99  The proposed bills provided that
government employees who violate the prohibition would suffer a loss
of salary.100  Similarly, bills in North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Utah would allow government employees who object to same-sex
marriage based on their sincerely held religious beliefs to opt out of
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.101
In Alabama, despite precedent declaring its ban on same-sex mar-
riage unconstitutional, Chief Justice Roy S. Moore of the Alabama
Supreme Court—the same judge who refused to remove the Ten
Commandments from the courthouse—ignored a federal judge’s rul-
ing and imposed a temporary halt to probate judges from issuing mar-
riage licenses.102  These pre-Obergefell attempts to defy an anticipated
U.S. Supreme Court ruling favoring same-sex marriage have been
abandoned or will suffer the same fate as Davis’s refusal to issue mar-
riage licenses to same sex couples.
III. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES AND THE PATH OF LEAST
RESISTANCE
The same-sex marriage debate made its way to the U.S. Supreme
Court in January 2015 when the high Court granted certiorari to a
consolidated group of four cases out of the Sixth Circuit.103  The con-
troversy before the Court followed the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals’ ruling, which upheld same-sex marriage bans in Kentucky,
Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee.104
99. Id.; see H.B. 1125, 55th Legislature, 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015) (passed in the house); H.B. 623,
84th Legislature, Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015) (in committee).
100. Fausset & Blinder, supra note 4. R
101. See H.B. 3150, 2015-2016 Gen Assemb., 121st Sess. (S.C. 2015) (dead); Ben Winslow,
Religious Freedom and Utah’s LGBT Compromise Legislature Highlighted at BYU Conference,
FOX 13: SALT LAKE CITY, http://fox13now.com/2015/07/06/religious-freedom-and-utahs-compro
mise-legislation-highlighted-at-byu-conference/ (last updated July 6, 2015, 8:18 PM); Herbert
Signs Bill for Officials To Refuse To Officiate Marriages, STANDARD EXAMINER (Mar. 20, 2015,
5:40 PM), http://www.standard.net/Government/2015/03/20/Utah-OKs-bill-for-officials-to-refuse-
to-officiate-marriages-1; North Carolina “Religious Freedom” Same-Sex Marriage Bill Now Law,
CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-carolina-religious-freedom-same-sex-marriage-
bill-now-law/ (last updated June 11, 2015, 11:15 AM).
102. Alan Blinder, Alabama Judge Defies Gay Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/us/gay-marriage-set-to-begin-in-alabama-amid-protest.html.
103. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039, 1040 (2015) (mem.).
104. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396–99, 421 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that 74% of Ken-
tucky voters, nearly 59% of the voters Michigan, 62% of Ohio voters, and 80% of Tennessee
voters supported a constitutional amemendment to define marriage as between one man and
one woman), rev’d by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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After the traditional definition of marriage had been codified in all
four state constitutions, sixteen gay and lesbian couples challenged the
same-sex marriage bans as violating their rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.105  The Kentucky plaintiffs were same-sex couples that
wished to obtain a marriage license from the state and couples mar-
ried outside of Kentucky that had cited tax, intestacy, and loss of dig-
nity resulting from the state’s refusal to recognize their marriages.106
The Ohio plaintiffs were surviving widows of same-sex marriages per-
formed in other states who had been left off of their beloveds’ death
certificates.107  The Tennessee plaintiffs were three same-sex couples
who were lawfully married in other states.108
Although the official legal question posed by the plaintiffs was
whether “the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment require States to expand the definition of
marriage to include same-sex couples,”109 the Sixth Circuit artfully de-
fined the issue in the following way: “Who decides?  Is this a matter
that the National Constitution commits to resolution by the federal
courts or leaves to the less expedient, but usually reliable, work of the
state democratic processes?”110
Turning to the merits, the Sixth Circuit cited Baker v. Nelson,111 a
Minnesota Supreme Court decision that upheld a Minnesota law that
limited marriage to persons of the opposite sex.112  Although the U.S.
Supreme Court summarily dismissed Baker without adjudication for
“want of [a] substantial federal question[,]”113 the Sixth Circuit re-
jected the argument furthered by claimants and legal scholars that
there have since been important doctrinal developments that super-
sede Baker, including the Court’s decision in Windsor and the deci-
sions from the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
declaring similar bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional.114  In-
stead, the Sixth Circuit found that Baker bound the court because it
was a controlling decision “on the merits” that the Minnesota Su-
105. Id. at 396.
106. Id. at 397–98.
107. Id. at 398.
108. Id. at 399.
109. Id.
110. DoBoer, 722 F.3d at 396.
111. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
112. Id. at 187.
113. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015).
114. See DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 401–02.
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preme Court never expressly overturned—by either name or direct
outcome.115
One by one, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed all of the
usual arguments for declaring same-sex marriage bans unconstitu-
tional, concluding in the end that the issue should remain in the hands
of the voters.116  The Sixth Circuit’s analysis began with the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.117  In doing so, it noted: “No-
body in this case . . . argues that the people who adopted the Four-
teenth Amendment understood it to require the States to change the
definition of marriage.”118  Against this backdrop, the court concluded
“that the Fourteenth Amendment permits, though it does not require,
States to define marriage” as between one man and one woman.119
Next, the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that the same-sex
marriage bans fail even rational basis review.120  It accepted the pro-
creation justification systematically cited by proponents of same-sex
marriage bans.121  It explained: “By creating a status (marriage) and
by subsidizing it (e.g., with tax-filing privileges and deductions), the
States created an incentive for two people who procreate together to
stay together for purposes of rearing offspring.”122  Concluding that
the bans satisfied rational basis review, the court concluded that this
reasoning did “not convict the States of irrationality, only of aware-
ness of the biological reality that couples of the same sex do not have
children in the same way as couples of opposite sexes and that couples
of the same sex do not run the risk of unintended offspring.”123
Next, reasoning that courts have previously struck down laws under
rational basis review only when they were found to have targeted a
single group for unfavorable treatment, the court considered whether
the bans were the result of invidious discriminatory animus.124  In
finding that they did not fall into this category, the court reasoned that
115. Id. at 401. But see Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir. 2014) (applying rational
basis review in striking down a same-sex marriage ban); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1096
(10th Cir. 2014) (finding that the fundamental right to marry encompasses same-sex marriage);
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding a fundamental right to same-sex
marriage); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229–30 (10th Cir. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d
456, 464–65 (9th Cir. 2014) (striking down a marriage ban on the bases of fundamental rights and
suspect class analyses).
116. DeBoer, 772 F.2d at 402–03.
117. Id. at 403.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 404.
120. See id. at 405–06.
121. Id.
122. DeBoer, 772 F.2d at 405.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 408.
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the four bans simply “codified a long-existing, widely held social norm
already reflected in state law.”125
The court refused to find a fundamental right to marry encompass-
ing same-sex marriage.126  To the contrary, the court emphasized the
narrow interpretation of Loving v. Virginia,127 which is often cited as
support for the argument that same-sex couples have a fundamental
right to marry.128  The Sixth Circuit clarified that “Loving confirmed
only that ‘opposite-sex marriage’ would have been considered redun-
dant, not that marriage included same-sex couples.”129
In rebutting the claimants’ reliance on other cases treating marriage
as a fundamental right, the court adamantly opined that “Loving and
its progeny . . . did not redefine the term [marriage] but accepted its
traditional meaning.”130  The court recognized that many states now
define marriage as “untethered to biology.”131  But, it refocused the
question to “whether the old reasoning applies to the new setting, not
whether we can shoehorn new meanings into old words.  Else, evolv-
ing-norm lexicographers would have a greater say over the meaning of
the Constitution than judges.”132
As stated, the U.S. Supreme Court rested its decision invalidating
the bans on same-sex marriage on substantive due process grounds.133
In doing so, the Court bypassed the dicey equal protection analysis
that would have engendered a level of higher judicial scrutiny in ana-
lyzing a law that discriminated against members of the LGBT commu-
nity.  Had sexual orientation been elevated into the category of a
quasi-suspect class, similar to classifications based on gender that trig-
ger intermediate scrutiny, the decision would have had broader impli-
cations for the LGBT community.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 411.
127. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s miscegenation law prohib-
iting marriage between Caucasians and other races on Equal Protection grounds).
128. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015); United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
129. DeBoer, 772 F.2d at 211 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).
130. Id. at 412.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 411–12; see supra note 69 and accompanying text. R
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IV. THE TENSION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND LGBT
RIGHTS
A. Places of Public Accommodation
As conservatives and liberals continue to be splintered over LGBT
rights, there is increasing anecdotal evidence regarding the tension be-
tween religious freedom and civil rights.  In 2015, a Michigan pediatri-
cian refused to treat a newborn baby of a same-sex couple, claiming
that she prayed on it and felt that, due to her religious objections to
the parents’ marriage, she would be unable to provide competent
treatment to the child.134  Pharmacists are refusing to provide the
“morning-after” pill to patients, claiming that the pill is adverse to
their religious beliefs about abortion.135  Even emergency medical ser-
vice providers have refused treatment to transgender patients on the
brink of death.136  These episodes forecast a narrative of RFRA-pro-
tected discrimination, culminating in what could look like a new wave
of separate-but-equal for the LGBT community.
This tension between religious freedom and civil rights has and will
continue to play out in the courtroom.  The New Mexico Supreme
Court’s 2006 decision in Elane Photography v. Willock137 provides a
prime illustration.  When a New Mexico photography company re-
fused to photograph a patron’s same-sex commitment ceremony in the
name of religious freedom, the patron sued, claiming that Elane Pho-
tography violated the New Mexico Human Rights Law’s prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  Ultimately,
civil liberties prevailed, trumping Elane Photography’s invocation of
the First Amendment.138
134. Tresa Baldas, Pediatrician Won’t Treat Baby with 2 Moms, USA TODAY (Feb. 19, 2015,
9:19 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/02/18/doctor-discrimination-baby/
23642091/.
135. See, e.g., Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Quinn, 2012 IL App (4th) 110398, ¶ 1 (holding that under
Illinois’ Health Care Right of Conscience Act, plaintiffs—consisting of two individual pharma-
cists and three corporate pharmacies—had the right to refuse dispensing emergency contracep-
tives based on their religious beliefs); see Doug Mataconis, Federal Court Rules Pharmacists
Cannot Be Forced To Sell “Morning After” Pill, OUTSIDE BELTWAY (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.
outsidethebeltway.com/federal-court-rules-pharmacists-cannot-be-forced-to-sell-morning-after-
pill/; Mary Wisniewski, Court: Illinois Can’t Force Pharmacists To Give ‘Morning After’ Pill,
NBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2012, 12:57 AM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/22/14026790-
court-illinois-cant-force-pharmacists-to-give-morning-after-pill?lite.
136. See, e.g., EMS Denied Transgender Patient Care Causing Her Death, Alleges Sheepshead
Bay Lawyer, SHEEPSHEAD BITES (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.sheepsheadbites.com/2013/04/ems-
denied-transgender-patient-care-causing-her-death-alleges-sheepshead-bay-lawyer/.
137. 2013-NMSC-040, 309 P.3d 53.
138. Id. ¶¶ 2–4, 11.
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Elane Photography spelled the start of a new era—an era in which
the LGBT community would find itself unfairly pitted against an in-
creasingly conservative religious community.  The tension caused by
this division grew as a slew of similar cases arose following Elane Pho-
tography.139  In the more recent case of State v. Arlene’s Flowers,
Inc.,140 a gay couple and the State of Washington sued a flower shop
owner for refusing to create the flower arrangements for the couple’s
same-sex wedding after the owner claimed that serving the couple
conflicted with her religious belief that marriage should “only be be-
tween a man and a woman.”141  The complaint alleged that the owner
and flower shop violated Washington’s Law Against Discrimination
(WLAD) and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).142  Although the
plaintiffs eventually prevailed,143 the case left many within the State of
Washington, and throughout the country, in further dissension over
the issue of LGBT civil rights vis-a`-vis businesses’ religious beliefs and
practices.144
Although New Mexico and the State of Washington did not have
mini RFRAs on the books at the time of these cases, the conflict in
Elane Photography and Arlene’s Flowers foreshadows the potential
real-life impact of an overly protective state RFRA.  With all of the
cards stacked in favor of religious freedom and no express antidis-
crimination protections for same-sex patrons, a court considering the
same case under an overly expansive mini RFRA may very well have
139. See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Civ. Comm’n,
Dec. 6, 2013) (finding that a Colorado bakery violated the state’s anti-discrimination law when it
refused to sell a same-sex couple a cake for their wedding); McCarthy v. Liberty Ridge Farm,
LLC, Nos. 10157952 & 10157963 (N.Y. Div. of Human Rights, Aug. 8, 2014) (finding that a
wedding venue violated New York’s antidiscrimination law when it refused to allow the plain-
tiffs, a lesbian couple, to book the venue for their wedding as a result of the owner’s personal
religious objections); see also Gay Adoptions in Illinois: Catholic Charities Threatens To Turn
Away Gay Couples, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/05/catholic-
charities-gay-adoption_n_858133.html (last updated July 5, 2011, 5:12 AM) (noting that several
Catholic charities in the Illinois chose to suspend their adoption and foster services rather than
comply with the state’s new civil union law, which require the charities to serve gay couples as
well).
140. No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 720213 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015) (mem.).
141. Id. at *5–6.
142. Id. at *3. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 19.86, 49.60 (2015).
143. Arlene’s Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *30–32.
144. See, e.g., FAM. POL’Y INST. OF WASH., SURVEY OF WASHINGTON RESIDENTS: RIGHTS OF
BUSINESSES WITH REGARD TO SAME-SEX WEDDINGS (2013) (on file with the DePaul Law Re-
view); Leo Hohmann, Flood of Christian Cash Rescuing Florist in Same-Sex War, WND (Apr. 6,
2015, 9:15 PM), http://www.wnd.com/2015/04/flood-of-christian-cash-rescuing-florist-in-same-
sex-war/; Joanne Moudy, Armed & Dangerous: The Terrorism of the LGBT Radicals, TOWN
HALL.COM (June 8, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://townhall.com/columnists/joannemoudy/2014/06/08/
armed—dangerous-the-terrorism-of-the-lgbt-radicals-n1848920/page/full.
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found in favor of Elane Photography. Elane Photography and other
cases like it forecast a dismal outcome for civil rights when those
rights become entangled with religious exercise claims in states armed
with unbridled RFRAs like Arkansas House Bill 1228.
Although antidiscrimination laws are not foolproof, one way to
strike an appropriate balance between religious exercise and civil
rights, and to keep RFRA in check, is to expressly prohibit discrimina-
tion on the bases of sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender
expression.  Otherwise, state, mini RFRAs could provide a pernicious
shield in discrimination suits.
B. Employment Discrimination
Perhaps not surprisingly, the tension between religious exercise and
LGBT rights also plays out in employment relationships.  Kenneth
Bencomo, a teacher at St. Lucy’s Priory High School in Glendora,
California, was fired after a local newspaper published photos of his
same-sex wedding.145  Likewise, a substitute teacher in Des Moines,
Iowa was denied a full-time position at the Dowling Catholic High
School after the Diocese of Des Moines learned that he was gay.146
When contacted by local media regarding the issue, Bishop Pates,
leader of the Diocese, defended the school’s position based on church
doctrine, stating that it was “[the school’s] expectation that staff and
teachers support our moral beliefs.”147  These two cases are just a few
examples of the myriad of employment termination cases faced by
LGBT individuals as a result of their sexual orientation or identity.148
145. Michael McGough, Gay Teacher Fired: Does Discrimination Law Trump Theological
Conviction?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/05/news/la-ol-gay-
teacher-fired-20130805; Judge: Gay Catholic School Teacher Reportedly Fired for Marrying Part-
ner Can Sue School, CBS L.A. (June 18, 2014, 11:04 AM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2014/06/
18/judge-gay-catholic-school-teacher-reportedly-fired-for-marrying-partner-can-sue-school/.
146. Nicole Hensley, Gay Substitute Teacher Denied Full-Time Job at Iowa Catholic School
After Being Outed as Engaged, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/
gay-staffer-denied-full-time-job-iowa-catholic-school-article-1.2177507 (last updated Apr. 8,
2015, 8:51 PM).
147. Trudy Ring, Watch: Iowa Catholic School Students Protest Denial of Job to Gay Teacher,
ADVOCATE (Apr 9, 2015, 4:07 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/religion/2015/04/09/watch-
iowa-catholic-school-students-protest-denial-job-gay-teacher (quoting Bishop Richard Pates).
148. See also, e.g., Ryan Houlihan, Carla Hale, Beloved Catholic School Teacher Fired for
Being Gay, Reaches Settlement with Former Employer, GLAAD (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.
glaad.org/blog/carla-hale-beloved-catholic-school-teacher-fired-being-gay-reaches-settlement-
former-employer (reporting that an Ohio physical education teacher was fired from a Catholic
school for her homosexual relationship being made public); Trudy Ring, Fired Gay Administra-
tor Sues Wash. Catholic School, ADVOCATE (Mar. 7, 2014, 6:55 PM), http://www.advocate.com/
politics/religion/2014/03/07/fired-gay-administrator-sues-wash-catholic-school (reporting a vice
principal was suing the Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle for being fired after marrying his long-
term partner).
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Employment discrimination against LGBT individuals can also be
seen in abundance in nonreligious contexts.  In Mitchell v. Axcan
Scandipharm, Inc.,149 a gender-transitioning employee diagnosed with
Gender Identity Disorder150 was terminated after she began living in
accordance with her gender identity and “present[ed] in public as a
female.”151  After her termination, she sued her employer for sex dis-
crimination under Title VII and Pennsylvania law.152  Similarly, in
Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail Inc.,153 the plaintiff, a transgender woman,
sued her employer after being forced to wear a nametag depicting her
previous male name, was denied the ability to use the women’s rest-
room and instead made to use either the unisex restroom or the men’s
room, and was eventually terminated from her employment.154  Al-
though these cases were eventually settled out of court, Mitchell and
Blatt illustrate the discrimination that LGBT individuals face at the
workplace.
Most recently, the family-owned corporation Hobby Lobby as-
serted religious objections to justify its refusal to pay for its employ-
ees’ insurance coverage for contraception.155  The nation’s highest
Court upheld Hobby Lobby’s objections, opining that businesses may
seek an accommodation or exemption from a law that would other-
wise require them to act in a way that was inconsistent with their sin-
cerely held religious beliefs.156  The Court’s watershed decision was a
turning point, recognizing business entities as personalities with relig-
ious identities and beliefs.
V. OFFENSIVENESS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.157 painted a new legal land-
scape for free exercise claims.  The Court’s decision opened the door
for increased demands from private entities for accommodations or
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability with little regard
149. No. Civ. A. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006).
150. The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders has renamed
the condition once described as “gender identity disorder” as “gender dysphoria.” AM. PSYCHI-
ATRIC PUB., GENDER DYSPHORIA (2013),  http://www.dsm5.org/documents/gender%20dysphoria
%20fact%20sheet.pdf.  For purposes of consistency with the Mitchell court’s terminology, the
authors will use the court’s language.
151. Mitchell, 2006 WL 456173, at *1.
152. Id.
153. No. Civ. A. 14-4822 (E.D. Pa.) (pending).
154. Blatt v. Cabella’s Retail, Inc., GLAD, http://www.glad.org/work/cases/blatt-v-cabelas-re
tail-inc (last visited Mar. 31, 2016).
155. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
156. Id. at 2785.
157. 134 S. Ct. 2751.
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to the problems of attenuation and harm to third parties.  This Part
explores how Hobby Lobby redesigned the terrain for free exercise
claims, which could ultimately result in the protection of religious
rights at the expense of LGBT civil rights.
In Hobby Lobby and Holt v. Hobbs,158 the Court emphasized its
broad interpretation of RFRA to provide the maximum protection to
religious freedom permitted by the U.S. Constitution.159  The facts of
Holt, which involved a religious inmate’s challenge to a prison policy,
represent the more typical type of free exercise claims.  Less typical,
Hobby Lobby challenged compliance with a law that may facilitate
conduct by a third party that offended Hobby Lobby’s religious be-
liefs.  There is a key distinction between Holt and Hobby Lobby.  The
prison policy at issue in Holt prevented Holt’s religious practice.  In
contrast, the insurance mandate only implicated Hobby Lobby’s relig-
ious beliefs by potentially making Hobby Lobby complicit in a third
party’s “immoral” conduct.  When broken down to its core, this criti-
cal legal distinction should really be framed as religious practice versus
offense based on religious beliefs.
The Court must distinguish between first-party religious freedom
claims and third-party offense claims.  When offense to a third party’s
conduct, far removed from the eyes and actual knowledge of the relig-
ious objector, is the heart of a complicity-based conscience claim,
RFRA cannot be used as a shield to discriminate in public accommo-
dations.  As in the area of free speech, rarely can a listener’s offense
silence the speaker.  Freedom of speech does not give way to a “heck-
ler’s veto.”  Likewise, in the war between religious freedom and
LGBT civil rights, a religious “heckler’s veto” should not trump
LGBT rights.
A. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Since the controversial ruling in Hobby Lobby there has been great
consternation about what religious free exercise claims should protect
and against whom.160  In Hobby Lobby, the Court upheld the corpo-
158. 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
159. See id. at 859–60; Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760–62.
160. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Opinion, The Religious Freedom Act Worked the Way It
Should, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/30/congress-
religion-and-the-supreme-courts-hobby-lobby-decision/the-religious-freedom-act-worked-the-
way-it-should; Kristina Peterson, Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby Ruling Ignites Debate over Re-
ligious-Freedom Law, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-courts-
hobby-lobby-ruling-ignites-debate-over-religious-freedom-law-1404155510; David B. Schwartz,
The NLRA’s Religious Exemption in a Post-Hobby Lobby World: Current Status, Future Diffi-
culties, and a Proposed Solution, 30 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227 (2015); Rachel Sibila, Com-
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ration’s RFRA claim that complying with the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act’s (ACA)161 essential benefits requirements for
covered insurance plans violated the corporation’s free exercise
rights.162  The now well-known Health and Human Services (HHS)
mandate requires covered insurance plans to provide preventative ser-
vices, including screenings, with no out-of-pocket costs to the in-
sured.163   Specifically, Hobby Lobby objected to four of the required
FDA-approved contraceptives.164  Hobby Lobby asserted that the
morning-after pill and the three other objected-to contraceptives were
abortifacients and that requiring its employer-provided insurance plan
to pay for those contraceptives violated its deeply held religious belief
that life begins at conception.165
In a 5-4 decision, the Court agreed with Hobby Lobby and had no
problem recognizing that a closely held corporation like Hobby Lobby
had standing under RFRA to bring a free exercise claim.166  Further,
the Court determined that Hobby Lobby established that the HHS
mandate (requiring employer-provided insurance plans to cover the
four objectionable contraceptives) imposed a substantial burden on
Hobby Lobby’s free exercise rights.167  Turning to the government’s
burden under RFRA, the Court held that because the government
already had a mechanism for accommodating nonprofit religious insti-
tutions, such as hospitals and universities, there were less restrictive
means of meeting the Government’s interests, which the Court as-
sumed, without deciding, were compelling.168
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority distorted
the coverage of RFRA far beyond its intended purpose, which was to
ment, “Play or Pay”: Interpreting the Employer Mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act as It Relates to Tribal Employers, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 235, 256 (2014); Andrew
Swindle, Note, Virgin Mary or Mary Magdalene: An Examination of the Contraceptive Mandate
Cases and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s Substantial Burden Standard, 66 ALA. L. REV.
925 (2015); Erik S. Thompson, Note, Compromising Equality: An Analysis of the Religious Ex-
emption in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act and Its Impact on LGBT Workers, 35 B.C.
J.L. & SOC. JUST. 285 (2015).
161. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
162. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
163. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2713, 124 Stat. at 131 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13); see also Terri R. Day et al., A Primer on Hobby Lobby: For-
Profit Corporate Entities’ Challenge to the HHS Mandate, Free Exercise Rights, RFRA’s Scope,
and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 55, 90–91 (2014).
164. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766.
165. Id. at 2759.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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reinstate the pre-Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources of Oregon v. Smith’s169 free exercise jurisprudence.170  She ar-
ticulated a clear difference between a nonprofit religious organization
and a for-profit corporation, and she opined that the latter had no
standing under RFRA.171  Because there was no precedent pre-Smith
for corporations other than churches to bring First Amendment Free
Exercise claims, for-profit corporations should have no standing to
bring a claim under RFRA.172
Beyond the standing issue, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority
for accepting, without analysis, Hobby Lobby’s assertion that the ob-
jected-to contraceptives required under the HHS mandate imposed a
substantial burden to its free exercise rights.173  The acceptance of this
notion without scrutiny failed to consider the attenuation between the
mandate’s requirement and Hobby Lobby’s actual knowledge of, or
participation in, an employee’s decision to use contraceptives.174  Fi-
nally, Justice Ginsburg would factor in a consideration of third parties’
rights into the substantial burden analysis.175  In contrast, the Court
considered the harm to third parties as part of the government’s bur-
den in justifying the challenged action under strict scrutiny.176  As part
of the least restrictive means prong of strict scrutiny, the Court deter-
mined that the accommodation to Hobby Lobby would not harm its
female employees because the government already had a less restric-
tive means to provide the insurance benefit to women in place.177
B. Holt v. Hobbs
A little over six months after its Hobby Lobby decision, the Court
once again addressed a Free Exercise claim under RFRA’s “sister
statute,” the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act of
2000 (RLUIPA).178  In Holt, the Court held that the Arkansas Depart-
169. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
170. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2791–92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2796–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
175. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
176. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2782.
178. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015). See generally Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Person Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000-cc to cc-5 (2012)).  In some of the literature, authors say that RFRA was the
result of the conservative Christian agenda and the bipartisan support that RFRA received as a
later embarrassment to liberal groups like ACLU. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The One-Relig-
ious-World-View Public Policy of the Conservative Christians and the Way out, VERDICT (Apr.
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ment of Correction’s grooming policy violated a Muslim prisoner’s
free exercise right to grow a half-inch beard for religious purposes.179
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Alito explained the history
of RFRA and its “sister statute,” RLUIPA.180  Both RFRA181 and
RLUIPA were Congress’s response to a Court decision that narrowed
the scope of free exercise claims.182  In essence, Congress counter-
manded the Court’s decision by passing more robust free exercise
rights under RFRA and RLUIPA.183  The Court stated that it would
construe both RLUIPA and RFRA as Congress intended, which is “to
the maximum extent permitted by [the statutes] and the
Constitution.”184
After Holt, it is unequivocal that these statutory claims protecting
religious liberty went beyond reinstating the pre-Smith free exercise
jurisprudence.  RFRA and RLUIPA define the scope of religious free-
dom to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by,
or central to, a system of religious belief.”185  Although plaintiffs in-
voking RFRA and RLUIPA must rest their request for accommoda-
16, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/16/the-one-religious-world-view-public-policy-of-the-
conservative-christians-and-the-way-out.
179. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 859.  The original purpose of RFRA was to reinstate the pre-Smith free
exercise analysis under strict scrutiny to a neutral, generally applicable law, and, over time,
RFRA has been expanded to provide more free exercise protection than pre-Smith. See Doug-
las Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Relig-
ion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2524 (2015) (explaining the difference between a Holt-type
claim (in which a prisoner grooming policy infringed on a prisoner’s free exercise rights and
accommodating the prisoner did not cause harm to third persons) and a Hobby Lobby-type
claim—which involves complicity with another person’s “sinning” (from a RFRA claimant’s per-
spective) because the claimant must comply with a government action (in Hobby Lobby, the
HHS mandate)).  Here, accommodation does affect third parties.  In this Article, we submit that
it is not a free exercise claim that the government should accommodate at the expense of third
persons; it is protection from offensive conduct as perceived through the eyes of the claimant.
180. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 859–60. See generally Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 179, at 2524–25 R
(explaining that Congress passed RFRA in response to the Court’s decision in Smith, 494 U.S.
872, which applied rational basis to neutral laws, of general applicability, that incidentally bur-
den the exercise of religion).  Congress passed RFRA pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that RFRA was inapplicable to the
states because Congress exceeded its Section 5 enforcement powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment.  521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).  In response to Flores, Congress passed RLUIPA pursu-
ant to its Spending and Commerce Clause powers. See Day et al., supra note 163, at 70 n.102; R
Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 179, at 2527 n.46. R
181. RFRA does not apply to the states. Flores, 521 U.S. at 519 (noting that Congress ex-
ceeded its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting RFRA as applica-
ble to the states).
182. See id. at 512–13.
183. See Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35, 59–61 (2015).
184. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 860 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)).
185. Id. at 860 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)).
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tions on a sincerely held religious belief and not on some other basis,
availability of alternative means to practice religion, which is relevant
under the First Amendment, is not a consideration under these statu-
tory claims.186
As applied in Hobby Lobby, RFRA requires the plaintiff to estab-
lish that the challenged action substantially burdens a religious prac-
tice or belief.187  Then, the burden shifts to the government to satisfy
strict scrutiny.188  Under strict scrutiny review, the government must
establish that its action furthers a compelling government interest and
is the least restrictive means of serving that interest.189  However, the
government’s burden is not met by establishing that the challenged
action is the least restrictive means of serving “broadly formulated
interests.”190  Rather, RFRA requires a “‘more focused’ inquiry” and
“requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest
test is satisfied through the application of the challenged law ‘to the
person’—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is
being substantially burdened.”191
This is a very deferential standard to the person or entity claiming a
RFRA violation.  It is a subjective test that is easily met, especially
given the ease with which the plaintiff can satisfy its burden—namely,
that the challenged action substantially burdens a sincerely held relig-
ious belief.192  In Holt, the Court weighed the harm in allowing the
prisoner to grow a beard in violation of the grooming policy against
the “marginal interest in enforcing” the Department of Correction’s
policy.193  In other words, under RFRA and RLUIPA, exemptions or
accommodations from neutral laws of general applicability must be
analyzed according to the particular context of the free exercise claim,
the specific plaintiff, and weighing the harm in granting the exemption
or accommodation against the interest in enforcing the challenged
government action.
In light of this very broad free exercise right that Congress codified
in RFRA, real concerns exist that state, mini RFRAs, some of which
186. Id. at 862.
187. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014).
188. Id. at 2779.
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
431 (2006)).
191. Id. (quoting O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430–31).
192. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862–63 (2015) (noting that a sincerely held religious
belief does not have to be central to the religion or shared by all members of the religious
groups); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s
lackadaisical analysis of the substantial burden prong of RFRA).
193. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 863 (quoting Hobby Lobby, at 134 S. Ct. at 2779).
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provide greater religious freedom protection than their federal coun-
terpart, would serve as both a shield and a sword to those who dis-
criminate against LGBT individuals in public accommodations,
employment, and housing.194  Further, RFRA and RLUIPA claims re-
quire government action; many of the state RFRAs allow private indi-
viduals and companies to assert a RFRA defense against private
parties who bring discrimination charges against them.195  Although
there is much debate about whether state, mini RFRAs do in fact pro-
vide a safe haven for those who discriminate, this tension between
free exercise rights and antidiscrimination principles has and will con-
tinue to play out in courtrooms.196
C. Private Litigants’ RFRA Claims and the State Action Doctrine
An interesting debate, perhaps only in academic circles, is whether
state RFRAs should apply to private litigants.197  Although the theo-
retical debate may be solely academic, the practical impact of the
reach of state RFRAs will have real-world consequences.  The argu-
ment that state RFRAs should not apply to private litigation concerns
the state action doctrine.198  Prior to state RFRAs, free exercise
claims required state action.199  Pre-RFRA, the typical free exercise
194. Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions
from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 71–73 (2015).
195. See Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 179, at 2574; Robert M. O’Neil, Religious Freedom and R
Nondiscrimination: State RFRA Laws Versus Civil Rights, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 785, 799 (1999)
(describing a landlord who raised a religious freedom defense).
196. See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115 (holding that a cake shop’s
refusal to make a cake for a same-sex wedding is discrimination and violates Colorado’s public
accommodation law, which does not impede on religious conduct or impose a substantial bur-
den); Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that the contraceptive man-
date and accommodation substantially burdened a nonprofit religious educational institution);
Grace Sch. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that the ACA’s accommodation for
religious institutions does not trigger contraception provision and does not substaintially burden
the plaintiffs); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927 (8th
Cir. 2015) (holding that nonprofit religious organizations are likely to succeed on the merits of
their RFRA challenges due to the substantial burden of the contraceptive mandate and accom-
modation and affirmed the preliminary injunction).
197. Sara Lunsford Kohen, Religious Freedom in Private Lawsuits: Untangling When RFRA
Applies to Suits Involving Only Private Parties, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 43, 46
(2011); Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, How Best To Understand State Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs): Part One in a Two-Part Series of Columns, VERDICT (Apr.
24, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/24/how-best-to-understand-state-religious-freedom-
restoration-acts-rfras; Michael C. Dorf, Religious Freedom Claims in Private Litigation, VERDICT
(Apr. 8, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/08/religious-freedom-claims-in-private-
litigation.
198. Kohen, supra note 197, at 57–58 (discussing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)). R
199. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04
(1940) (stating that the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the liberties
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claim involved some government requirement that infringed on an in-
dividual’s religious practice or belief (like the Holt facts).200  It was the
government, not a private third party, that infringed on a claimant’s
free exercise rights.201  So, recognizing free exercise claims based on a
private person’s action extends the Free Exercise Clause beyond its
constitutionally intended application.
Nevertheless, constitutional claims are frequently raised in private
litigation, and examples arise within the context of the Free Speech202
and Equal Protection Clauses.203  In a recent case, the Supreme Court
overturned a jury verdict for the father of a fallen soldier who sued
protesters at his son’s funeral for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.204  Although there was no allegation that a government regu-
lation violated the protesters’ free speech rights, there was a state law
creating a private cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.205  Considering that the grieving father’s  claim against
the protesters rested on a state created privately enforced tort, the
First Amendment claim was justiciable despite the fact that the gov-
ernment was not the alleged speech violator.  The state action doc-
trine was satisfied by the state created private cause of action,
subjecting a purely private dispute to constitutional limitations.206
In the context of equal protection and questions of state action, the
Court examined whether a Batson peremptory jury challenge should
apply in a civil trial.207  Because a peremptory challenge in a civil case
guaranteed in the First Amendment); Kohen, supra note 197, at 48 (explaining that RFRA al- R
lows a person whose religious rights have been burden by the government to bring a claim
against the government).
200. Kohen, supra note 197, at 59; Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 179, at 2524. R
201. Kohen, supra note 197, at 59. R
202. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 450 (2011) (involving a church that argued its
speech was constitutionally protected from a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (involving constitutional protections
in a claim for lible).
203. See, e.g., Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (recog-
nizing that a person of a “class of one,” not a part of a class, can bring an equal protection claim
against the government); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
204. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 447–48.
205. See id. at 450–51.
206. See id. at 451 (“The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment . . . can serve as a
defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
207. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that gender,
like race, cannot be used to establish a juror’s competency or impartiality); Georgia v. McCol-
lum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that it is unconstitutional for a criminal defendant to engage
in purposeful racial discrimination when exercising peremptory challenges); Edmonson v. Lees-
ville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (holding that a peremptory challenged on the basis
of race in a civil trial violates the excused juror’s equal protection rights); Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding that regardless of whether the criminal defendant and the excused
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does not involve the prosecutor, who is a state actor, the Court ad-
dressed the question of whether private discrimination in the selection
of jurors triggers the Equal Protection Clause.208  The Court held that
it does.209  Although the discriminatory action is not by a state actor,
the setting in which it occurs—a civil courtroom—implicates the state
in facilitating the discrimination and, if unchecked, gives the state’s
imprimatur to the discrimination.210
There are many other examples of private disputes that can invoke
claims of constitutional violations.211  In these cases, the constitutional
violation may not occur by a state actor, but is, instead, facilitated by
state action.  In civil suits based on state law claims or in selecting a
jury in a civil trial, there is no bar to alleging and litigating constitu-
tional violations, despite the fact that the government is not a party in
the lawsuit.212
The argument that application of state RFRA laws in private dis-
putes violates the state action doctrine is premised on the notion that
a RFRA claim does not establish rights; instead, it is a rights-neutral
statute.213  Unlike the tort law claim and the peremptory jury chal-
lenge, a RFRA claim sets the standard of judicial review for a free
exercise claim.214  RFRA is a statutory claim for an exemption or ac-
commodation from a neutral law “unless the application of the neutral
law is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government inter-
est.”215  Thus, when the claim involves private litigants and there is no
dispute regarding the constitutionality of applying a rule, standard, or
procedure, the requisite state action is minimal.216  The only state in-
volvement in a private RFRA claim is to enforce, or not to enforce,
juror share the same race, the defendant may object to the prosecution’s peremptory challenge
on the basis of race).
208. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616.
209. Id. at 631.
210. Id. at 628.
211. See, e.g., McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (holding that a criminal defendant can violate the Equal
Protection Clause by racially discriminating in the exercise of peremptory challenge); Powers,
499 U.S. 400 (holding that regardless of whether the criminal defendant and the excused juror
share the same race, the defendant may object to the prosecution’s peremptory challenge on the
basis of race); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485  (1984) (invoking the
First Amendment as a defense to a claim of defamation and actual malice); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding an Alabama law unconstitutional because of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official for criticisms of his official
conduct).
212. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622; Powers, 499 U.S. at 415.
213. Dorf, supra note 197; Kohen, supra note 197, at 45. R
214. See Dorf, supra note 197. R
215. Id.
216. See id.
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the parties’ obligations under a neutral law.217  This is quite different
than the Batson peremptory jury challenge in a civil case in which the
court’s involvement facilitates the racial discrimination.218
However, this view of minimal state involvement is too narrow.  In
a private dispute that does not challenge the constitutionality of a le-
gal rule or procedure, the RFRA claim requires a determination of
whether the neutral law from which a claimant seeks accommodation
or exemption meets strict scrutiny.219  Even when the government is
not a party in the dispute, the neutral law is state action and applica-
tion to the RFRA claimant must be justified under strict scrutiny,
which focuses on the government interest and its means of meeting
that interest.220
Further, the type of private disputes that raises questions about ap-
plication of state RFRAs usually involves a nondiscrimination law
(such as a public accommodation law), and the RFRA claimant’s
request for an exception for noncompliance is based on religious free-
dom.221  If there is no antidiscrimination law applicable, then, presum-
ably, a religious objection to providing goods and services to
particular individuals would be permissible.  A RFRA “free pass” for
a private party to discriminate based on religious objections would
only arise when an antidiscrimination law or a public accommodation
law was violated.222  Thus, like the application of a tort law claim to
private litigants, the application of RFRA as a “defense” to discrimi-
nation would implicate legal rules and give rise to state action.
A clearer lens through which to view the state action doctrine to
RFRA claims focuses on the party seeking to impose a neutral law on
the religious objector.  As stated, usually it is the government impos-
ing application of a neutral law to which a RFRA claimant seeks an
exemption or accommodation.  These were the facts in Holt.  In that
case, the prisoner claimed that the application of the Department of
Correction’s no beard policy violated his religious rights.223  In con-
217. Id.
218. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986).
219. Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives, Truly
Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 153, 157 (2015).
220. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2012).
221. Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 179, at 2520. R
222. See, e.g., Camila Domonoske, North Carolina Passes Law Blocking Measures To Protect
LGBT People, TWO-WAY (Mar. 24, 2016, 11:29 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2016/03/24/471700323/north-carolina-passes-law-blocking-measures-to-protect-lgbt-people (ex-
emplifying that attempts to block local anti-discrimination ordinances will make it easier for
businesses to refuse service to same sex couples based on religious objections because there is no
law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation).
223. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60 (2015).
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trast, Hobby Lobby objected to the indirect consequences of compli-
ance with a neutral law.224  The facilitation of religiously objectionable
behavior by a third party through application of a neutral law violated
Hobby Lobby’s conscience.225  Forced compliance with the HHS man-
date made Hobby Lobby complicit in its employees using contracep-
tives, which the Court found to violate Hobby Lobby’s deeply held
religious views.226  The objection was participating in or facilitating
their employees’ immoral conduct as judged by Hobby Lobby’s relig-
ious beliefs.227
D. The Complicity-Based Conscience Claim
In their recent Yale Law Journal article, Professors Nejaime and
Siegel characterized the RFRA claim in Hobby Lobby as a “complic-
ity-based conscience claim.”228  These claims differ from the more typ-
ical Holt-type claim.  As Nejaime and Siegel point out, the complicity-
based conscience claim, as typified by Hobby Lobby’s RFRA claim,
has the “potential to inflict harms on specific third parties.”229  This is
the crux of concern about state RFRA claims and how they will be
used to inflict harm by discriminating against third parties, specifically
members of the LGBT community.230
In their article, Professors Nejaime and Siegel trace the history of
these Hobby Lobby-type complicity-based conscience claims to health
care refusal laws and the Church Amendment of 1973.231  Health care
refusal laws provide exemptions for health care providers from treat-
ing potential patients (typically involving abortion services) based on
religious objections.232  Eventually, these laws broadened their ex-
emptions to cover persons and entities who were only tangentially in-
volved with the potential patient seeking an abortion.233  The theory
224. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014).
225. See id.
226. Id. at 2759.
227. Id. at 2778.
228. Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 179, at 2519. R
229. Id. at 2524. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799–2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (expressing concern over the harm caused to third parties, namely Hobby Lobby’s female
employees, by exempting or accommodating Hobby Lobby from the HHS mandate due to its
complicity-based religious claim).
230. Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 179, at 2524. R
231. Id. at 2534–39. See generally Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 (Church Amend-
ment), Pub. L. No. 93-45, §§ 401(b)–(c), 87 Stat 91, 95 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
232. See Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 179, at 2536; see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453- R
16(e) (LexisNexis 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(b) (West 2004); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5424(c)–(d) (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.065 (West 2014).
233. Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 179, at 2538–42. R
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underlying these health care refusal laws was that the objectors’ free
exercise rights were burdened by  complicity providing abortions or
other objected-to medical services that violated the health care prov-
iders’ and the medical facilities’ religious beliefs.234
Both the health care refusal laws and the Church Amendment fol-
lowed Roe v. Wade,235 which continues to be a very controversial rul-
ing that decriminalized abortions and recognized a constitutional right
for women to choose to terminate an early pregnancy.236  “The
Church Amendment inaugurated a widespread tradition of healthcare
refusals legislation at the federal and state levels.”237  In passing the
amendment, Congress responded to a district court case that enjoined
a Catholic-affiliated hospital from refusing to perform sterilizations.238
In granting the injunction, the district court concluded that a hospital
receiving federal funds was a state actor.239  The Church Amendment
overturned this district court holding.240  It provided that there was no
requirement, based on receipt of federal funds, for hospitals and
health care providers “to perform or assist in the performance of any
sterilization procedure or abortion . . . if  . . . [it] would be contrary to
[their] religious beliefs or moral convictions.”241  The Church Amend-
ment was intended to protect individuals who had conscience-based
objections to performing abortions and sterilizations and those who
actually performed the procedures from discrimination.242  However,
over time, health care refusal laws only protected health care provid-
ers who raised conscience-based objections, providing protection from
discrimination and exemptions from specific statutory and ethical du-
ties owed to patients.243
Against this backdrop, Hobby Lobby seems like a natural extension
of the health care refusal laws, granting the same type of protections
to a broader group of individuals.  These protections have moved
from the medical facilities and providers to the board room and em-
ployers.  The next frontier is the business owner claiming conscience-
based objections to serving LGBT persons.  An extension of these
conscience-based claims to providing services to LGBT couples and
234. Id. at 2538–39.
235. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
236. Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 179, at 2535–36. See generally Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. R
237. Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 179, at 2537. R
238. Id. at 2536 (citing Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973)).
239. Taylor, 369 F. Supp. at 950–51.
240. Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 179, at 2536. R
241. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(1) (2012)).
242. Id.
243. See id. at 2534–35 (discussing common law and statutory duties like referring patients or
counseling patients of all their options).
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families threatens to create a slippery slope.  As such, there could be
no end to religious claimants’ objections to providing goods and ser-
vices to the LGBT community, as is required by public accommoda-
tion laws and professional ethical standards, based on complicity in or
facilitation of morally objectionable conduct by third parties.
This is precisely the concern that Justice Sotomayor expressed in
her scathing dissent in Wheaton College v. Burwell.244  Three days af-
ter the Hobby Lobby decision, the Court granted preliminary injunc-
tive relief with regard to Wheaton College’s RFRA claim, which
stated that the very accommodation supporting the Hobby Lobby de-
cision violated its free exercise rights.245  The accommodation granted
nonprofit religious organizations and businesses like Hobby Lobby an
exemption from objected-to contraceptives in their employer-spon-
sored insurance plan, as required by the HHS mandate, by notifying
its insurance carrier or a third-party administrator.246  Wheaton Col-
lege’s RFRA claim alleged that “authorizing its [third-party adminis-
trator] to provide these drugs in [its] place[ ] makes it complicit in
grave moral evil.”247  In essence, even filling out the form as required
by the accommodation violated its free exercise rights under
RFRA.248
Given the very high standard for granting a preliminary injunction,
requiring the claimant to show that the right to relief on the merits is
“indisputably clear,”249 Justice Sotomayor viewed the Court’s decision
as undermining confidence in the Court.250  She stated:
After expressly relying on the availability of the religious-nonprofit
accommodation to hold that the contraceptive coverage require-
ment violates RFRA as applied to closely held for-profit corpora-
tions, the Court now, as the dissent in Hobby Lobby feared it might,
retreats from that position.  That action evinces disregard for even
the newest of this Court’s precedents . . . .251
Contrary to Justice Sotomayor’s concerns, the circuit courts, which
have addressed Wheaton College’s and other similar RFRA claims on
the merits (seeking permanent injunctive relief), have ruled that the
244. 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2810 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
245. Day et al., supra note 163, at 104 (citing Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., R
dissenting)).
246. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2809 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 2812 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Hobby Lobby,
134 U.S. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
248. Id. at 2809 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 2810 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 507
U.S. 1301, 1304 (1993)).
250. Id. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
251. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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accommodation does not violate RFRA.252  In fact, the Court granted
certiorari in Zubik v. Burwell.253  In a per curiam opinion, the Court
vacated the judgments in the cases and remanded to the various
circuits:
to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petition-
ers’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women
covered by petitioners’ health plans “receive full and equal health
coverage, including contraceptive coverage.”254
Contrary to the circuit courts’ decisions, the Court’s ruling was a com-
promise based on the fact that both the Petitioners and the Govern-
ment agreed that the Petitioners’ employees could receive the covered
contraceptives from the Petitioners’ insurance plans without requiring
the Petitioners to give notice or take any action at all.255  Although the
Court did not rule on the merits of Petitioners’ RFRA claims (that
providing notice to their insurance company or the Secretary of HHS
violated Petitioners’ Free Exercise rights under RFRA), the Court’s
compromise ruling does not create a bright-line determination that
these complicity claims take RFRA “a bridge too far.”
VI. BALANCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND LGBT CIVIL RIGHTS
Echoing the aftermath of Roe, the losing side on the same-sex mar-
riage issue has, and will continue to, lobby state legislatures to pass
robust RFRA laws and laws banning local nondiscrimination ordi-
nances that extend protections to members of the LGBT community.
Having lost in the Court, same-sex marriage opponents have garnered
legislative support to impose their religious view of morally correct
behavior on others.  The next chapter of religious indignation claims
will give license to discriminate.
Although not framed as religious liberty versus freedom from dis-
crimination, Justice Ginsburg parroted the concerns she raised in her
Hobby Lobby dissent in her Holt concurrence.256  In her one para-
252. See, e.g., Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 801 (7th Cir. 2015); Wheaton Coll. v.
Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551, 552–53 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (challenging a proposed rule from
the HHS requiring religious colleges to cover contraception through their health insurance);
Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 929 F.Supp. 2d 402, 437 (W.D. Pa. 2013); Roman Catholic Diocese of
Dallas v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 406, 426–27 (N.D. Tex. 2013); see also Cases in the Pipeline,
BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last
updated Nov. 2, 2015)  (listing of all the cases that challenged the notification to insurance com-
pany accommodation as violating RFRA).
253. 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam).
254. Id. at 1560 (quoting the Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 1).
255. Id.
256. Justice Ginsburg’s concerns include attenuation and harm to third parties who “do not
share petitioner’s belief.”  Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
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graph concurrence, Justice Ginsburg re-emphasized her concern that
in accommodating free exercise claims, courts should consider the
harm caused to third persons who do not share the RFRA claimant’s
religious beliefs.257  Extending this principle to scenarios in which in-
dividuals and businesses refuse services to LGBT persons and families
on the basis of religious freedom, those discriminated against will cer-
tainly suffer dignitary harm.
Over seventy years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that
segregation in public schools harmed children by “generat[ing] a feel-
ing of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”258  The
Court took special solicitude in the fact that segregation in public
schools harmed children.  Similarly, discrimination in public accom-
modations and other areas of public life against LGBT families also
harms children.  Like the school-children plaintiffs in Brown v. Board
of Education,259 children in LGBT families are equally vulnerable and
susceptible of sustaining irreversible feelings of inferiority when they
and their family members are discriminated against—in the name of
religion—based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  Further,
children are not the only victims harmed by efforts to preemptively
strike against same-sex marriage rights.  Justice Kennedy linked the
fundamental right to marry, regardless of sexual orientation, to human
dignity.  Condemning same-sex marriage as an offense to religion and,
therefore, justifying discrimination certainly inflicts dignitary harm on
all members of the LGBT community.  In some ways, condoned dis-
crimination in the name of religion gives added legitimacy to
discrimination.
Turning from the third-party harm issue to Justice Ginsburg’s sec-
ond concern about attenuation, RFRA’s broad definition of religious
exercise is problematic when considering the disconnect between a
RFRA claimant’s religious exercise and providing services in public
accommodations.260 Inference upon inference must be made to link
the two.  Originally, RFRA was intended to reinstate free exercise
analysis prior to Smith.261  It was not intended to be the basis on which
private persons and companies could discriminate in public life by ele-
vating their private religious beliefs above the rights of persons to be
(citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, at 2787–88, 2790 & n.8, 2791, 2801
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
257. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
258. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
259. 347 U.S. 483.
260. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
261. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)–(b) (2012).
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treated equally in places of public accommodations.  In fact, when
scrutinizing exactly what religious belief or practice is burdened by
adherence to nondiscrimination practices in public accommodations,
it is difficult to characterize the burden as anything beyond offense.262
In other areas of constitutionally protected First Amendment free-
doms, offense is never enough to justify squashing another person’s
rights.  Particularly in the area of free speech, the Court has said over
and over again that speech is not to be abridged because it causes
offense to others.263  From the early seditious libel cases, Justice
Holmes admonished that suppressing opinions because of their offen-
siveness is dangerous to our constitutional democracy.264  In New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,265 the Court recognized that the First
Amendment demanded breathing space for political discussion and
criticism of official conduct that may include half truths and misinfor-
mation.266  Free speech depends on unfettered debate, which “may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks on government and public officials”267 as well as on private indi-
viduals.268  Further, permissible speech is not sanitized to the most
262. Day et al., supra note 163, at 102–03. R
263. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“[W]e have . . . consistently stressed that ‘we
are often captives outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech.’”
(quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).  The Court reiterated the basic
premise of the First Amendment Free Speech Clause that, outside the privacy of the home,
people must tolerate offensive speech so that “a majority [cannot] silence dissidents simply as a
matter of personal predilections.” Id.; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1970)
(reversing the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness, whose speech attacking the Catholic religion
and church offended two listeners, on the premise that to protect the First Amendment, those
who try to persuade others of their beliefs may be offensive with impunity as long as the speaker
does not provoke violence).
264. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
that criticism is a characteristic of a proletarian dictatorship and “the only meaning of free
speech is that [anti-government beliefs] should be given their chance and have their way”);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussing the theory
of the U.S. Constitution as an experiment and expressing that “we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions we loathe . . . [unless dire circumstance] is
required to save the country”)).
265. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
266. Id. at 270–71 (constitutionalizing the law of defamation against public officials).  “[There
is] a profound national commitment to the principles that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .  The constitutional protection [of free speech] does not
turn upon ‘the truth, popularity, or social utility of ideas and beliefs which are offered.’” Id.
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)).
267. Id.
268. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (reversing a jury verdict for damages against
protesters at a fallen soldier’s funeral who allegedly caused the soilder’s father intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress when they protested at his son’s funeral).
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sensitive members of society.269  Even children in public places must
avert their eyes to protect free speech.270
Some may argue that relabeling an individual’s religious belief as
offense trivializes religious freedom.  Quite the contrary, recognizing a
distinction between burdening religious freedom and causing offense
preserves the important value placed on religious freedom.  Just as all
speech is not valued the same under the First Amendment’s Free
Speech Clause,271 not all free exercise claims are equal.  In determin-
ing that a religious belief is sufficiently burdened to sustain the right
of a proprietor of a public accommodation to deny service to LGBT
patrons, a totality of factors should be considered.  These factors
should include: (1) how public the business is; (2) the nexus between
the religious belief and the service denied; and (3) the harm done to
third persons in denying the service.  Two of these factors draw from
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Hobby Lobby.  She criticized the major-
ity’s RFRA analysis for not considering the factors of attenuation and
harm to third persons in the statutory prong that requires the claimant
to show a substantial burden to religious belief imposed by the chal-
lenged government action.272
The First Amendment religion clauses require a fine balance be-
tween religious life and secular life.  The Free Exercise Clause de-
mands respect for individual religious beliefs and, at times, a
requirement to accommodate or exempt an individual or entity from
compliance with a neutral law of general applicability.273  However,
swinging the pendulum too far in favor of religious freedom may im-
pose burdens on nonbelievers and threaten violation of the Establish-
269. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971) (noting that an unwilling listener or
viewer cannot be shielded from offensive speech unless substantial privacy interests are impli-
cated—like speech invading the privacy of the home).
270. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (holding that the interest of pro-
tecting children did not justify a city ordinance prohibiting drive-in theaters from showing films
that depict nudity).  “Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other
legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images
that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”  Id. at 213–14.  See, for example, Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent.
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), for the proposition that offense to children is
not sufficient to suppress otherwise protected speech.
271. Commercial speech receives intermediate scrutiny. See Cnt. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp v.
N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566  (1980).
272. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2799, 2801 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
273. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012); John Lyle, Comment, Contraception and Corporate Per-
sonhood: Does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment Protect For-Profit Corporations
That Oppose the Employer Mandate?, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 137, 157 (2013) (citing U.S.
CONST. amend. I).
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ment Clause.  The First Amendment religion clauses require a balance
between government neutrality and accommodation.
In mediating this latest war between religious freedom and LGBT
rights, the interplay between enforcing public accommodation laws
and granting defenses to compliance through RFRA religious free-
dom claims must honor this fine balance.  The courts will be called on
to perform this delicate balancing act.  In doing so, the courts should
distinguish between offense and religious belief.  When denial of ser-
vices is based on offense (even if grounded in religious doctrine), then
enforcing public accommodation laws is not at odds with religious
freedom.
VII. CONCLUSION
After Justice Kennedy opined in Windsor that human dignity de-
mands respect for same-sex couples’ committed relationships, there
was an explosion of litigation attacking same-sex marriage bans.274
Courts across the country overwhelmingly held that same-sex mar-
riage is a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses.275  These pro-LGBT court
decisions catalyzed a nationwide movement of local communities’ ef-
forts to extend nondiscrimination protections to the LGBT
community.276
Even before the Court published its historic Obergefell decision, op-
ponents of same-sex marriage, who feared an unfavorable decision,
marshaled their energies toward legislative, rather than court, sup-
port.277  Attempting to stem the tide of support for LGBT-expanding
civil rights, the anti-same-sex marriage movement galvanized efforts
to win legislative victories on the state level that would neutralize, or
even block, this growing pro-LGBT rights trend.
In essence, those discriminating against LGBT individuals relabeled
themselves as the “discriminated.”  Invoking religious freedom, citi-
zens lobbied their state legislators to pass robust mini-RFRA laws and
laws intended to nullify local nondiscrimination ordinances protecting
the LGBT community.278  Following the success of anti-abortion sup-
porters who lobbied state and federal legislators to limit the effects of
274. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (discussing the over fifty same-sex mar- R
riage ban challenges throughout the nation in the years following the Windsor decision).
275. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (listing several cases upholding marriage R
equality).
276. See Local Employment Non-Discrimination Ordinances, supra note 74. R
277. See supra notes 76–102 and accompanying text. R
278. Id.
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Roe by passing health refusal laws, the opponents to same-sex mar-
riage have found a way to undermine Obergefell and stymie local
LGBT anti-discrimination efforts through their legislative successes.
With the rise of robust mini-RFRAs and other laws protecting relig-
ious freedom at the expense of civil rights, the country is at a cross-
road.  Indeed, robust state RFRA laws and state laws that intend to
preempt local, LGBT-inclusive, nondiscrimination ordinances
threaten to create a system that, in the aggregate, legally sanctions
discrimination in public accommodations in the name of religious
freedom.  Emboldened by Hobby Lobby, public entities can now de-
mand exemptions from public accommodation laws by refusing to
provide services and goods to members of the LGBT community
based on conscience-based objections to same-sex marriage. Hobby
Lobby legitimized the complicity-based RFRA claim; proprietors of
public accommodations and health care professionals will claim their
religious beliefs require that they deny services to LGBT couples and
families or risk being complicit in immoral conduct.
RFRA was never intended to be a shield to those who discriminate
in places of public accommodation or in violation of ethical standards.
Although religious freedom is indeed important, courts must be cau-
tious not to lose sight of a critical legal distinction: offensiveness to
another’s personal lifestyle choices does not amount to a true “restric-
tion” or “burden” on an individual’s right to “exercise of religion.”279
Conscience-based claims based on complicity with attenuated activity
that is out of the sight and control of the religious objector target “of-
fense,” not religious belief or practice.  In the context of the Court’s
free speech jurisprudence, it is axiomatic that offense is not enough to
grant a heckler’s veto to permit a listener to silence a speaker.  Like-
wise, in free exercise claims, a religious objector’s offense does not
warrant a heckler’s veto to discriminate on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity.
This modern kultur kampf pits religious freedom against nondis-
crimination principles and is reminiscent of the post-Brown era when
governors blocked efforts to integrate public schools.  Just as gover-
nors and segregationists defied the U.S. Supreme Court’s edict that
“separate is NOT equal,” the present war to stifle LGBT civil rights
has the potential to create a new wave of separate but not equal in
delivery of goods and services by proprietors of public accommoda-
tions and health care providers.
279. See supra notes 263–71 and accompanying text (discussing how the Free Exercise Clause R
should not allow people to claim religious freedom burden solely on the basis of offense just as
the Free Speech Clause does not allow those who are offended by speech to silence the speaker).
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To avoid the return to a pernicious system of separate but equal,
this time targeted at the LGBT community, courts analyzing RFRA
claims between private litigants must distinguish offense-based claims
from free exercise claims by considering the context, attenuation, and
harm to third persons.  The substantial burden element of a RFRA
claim places the burden of proof on the claimant.  As Justice Ginsburg
emphasized in her Hobby Lobby dissent and Holt concurrence, atten-
uation and harm to third parties are serious considerations in RFRA
claims.280  Especially when the RFRA litigants are both private par-
ties, courts should factor context, attenuation, and third-party harm
into the substantial burden element, placing the burden on the RFRA
claimant to establish an actual burden on his or her religious belief or
practice as opposed to mere offense to LGBT couples and their fami-
lies.  With important civil rights hanging in the balance, courts must
tread cautiously and refrain from departing from the time-honored
rule that offensiveness to another person’s lifestyle choices is an insuf-
ficient legal justification to quash sacrosanct civil rights.
280. See supra notes 256–72 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s opinions). R
